## NEW YORK, SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 6, 1848.

cer of Adju'ant General's Department with me in the campaign C.n another instance be olted of denying to a General-in-Chief. In the field, at the head of a large army, or even a small one, the selection of his chief of the staff—that is, the chief in the Department of Orders and Gorrespondence?

Early in the following January, I asked that a General Court Martial might be appointed, an the part of the Fresident, for the trial of two officers (named by me) for conduct each had committed, that endangered, is a high degree, the success of the impending campaign; and I specially referred to the anomalous and fatal act of Congress. (May 29, 1830), which prohibited me, as the accuser or procedure from ordering the court for the trial of the cases. My application has never been noticed. This neglect, alone, ought early to have admoniabed me that I had no hope of upport at Washington, in any attempt I might make (aguinst certain officers) to maintain necessary discipline in the army I was about to lead to the field. Hert Washington highly fattered with the confidence and kindness the Fresident had just shown me in many long personal interviews on military matters. For more than two months my expressions of gratifule were daily and fervent, nor were they much less emphatic toward the head of the Wa- Department Proceeding with zeal and confidence in my most hazardous duties, I learned, January 27, at the Brazza Santiago, that an attempt was on foot to create a Licutenant General to take command in the field over me. Shocked and distressed, I allowed of no relaxation in my efforts to serve my country, resolved, for the short time I was likelyto remain in commission, to be "True as the dial to the sun, A yet greater outrage soon followed; falling to obtain an act for the eitizen Lieutenant General, a bill was pressed upon Congress to authorise the placing a junjor Mojor General junt appointed (the same individual) in command or the eitizen Lieutenant General; and the work of the first part of the first part of the first pa

and orderenes oftone (from the North) there will be retable nor but proposed, basilest with the vessilest order to proposed, solidar with the vessile and the take up and own out in ballast (the troops) unthere is no proposed to the proposed of the comments of the co ordinance stores.

The first letter that I received from the Department, after entering the captured city, contained an elsborate rebuke (dated Feb. 22) for having ordered Colonel Harney, 2d dragoons, to remain in the command of the cavalry with M-jor General Taylor, so as to leave Major Sunner. of the same regiment, the senior of that arm in my expedition. There was no great difference in the number of cavalry companies with the two armies. This rebuke was written with a complecency that argued the highest professional experience la such matters, and could not have been more confident in its tone, if dictated to the greenst general of the recent appointments. Yet, without the power of selecting commanders of particular corps, no General-la-Chief would venture to take upon himself the conduct of a critical campaign. Such selections were always made by the Father of his country and the principal generals under him. So in the exampling of 1814, I myself sent away, against their wishes, three senior field efficers, of as many regiments, who were infirm, uninstructed and inefficient, in favor of the resigning, and with the subsequent approbation of Major General Brown, on his joining me, and the head of the War Department. Both were well acquainted with the customs of war in like case at home and abroad; and without that energy on my part, it is highly probable that no American citizen would ever have cited the battles of the Niagara without a righ for his country. I am happy, however, that before a word had been received from the Department, and, indeed, before it could have had any knowledge of the question, I had decided to take with me the frank and g-llant Colonel, and hops soon to learn that he, and very many other officers, have been rewarded with brevets for their highly distinguished services in the campa'ga that followed.

It was in reference to the same rebuke, that in acknowledging your communication I said, from Vera Cruz April 6:—

"I relight very well controvert the military principles so confidently

transports siege train and ordinance stores, then aiready experienced, I wrote to the department from Lobos, Feb. 29:—

Perhaps no expedition was ever so unaccountably delayed—by no want of foresight, arrarg ment or energy on my part, as I dore affirm—and under circumstances the most critical to this entire army; for everybody relied upon, knew from the first, as well as I knew, it would be fatal to us to attempt military operations on this coast after, probably, the first wask in April; and here we are at the end of February. Nevertheless, this army is in heart, and crippled as I am in the means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect to take Vera Cruz and its castle in time to escape, by pursuing the enemy, the peatlence of the cosat?

The city and costle were captured March 20; and with about one fourth of the necessary means for a road train (no fault of mine) the retreat, in pursuit of the enemy, was vigorously commenced, April 3. The battle of Certo Gordo soon followed, and we occupied Jalaps and Perote, where we were obliged to wait for supplies from Vera Cruz. In those positions I was made to writhe under another cruel disappointment.

In my four memorials to the department, on the further prosecution of the war sgainst Mexico, written at Weshington, and dated respectively October 27, Nov. 21 16, and 21—(it was only intimated to me in the night of November 18 that I might prepare myself for the field)—pagers in which I demonstrated that Vera Cruz was the true base of operations, and that the enemy's capital could not probably be reached from the Rio Grande, I estimated that, after taking that great seaport, "about 20,000 men," or "an army of more than 20,000 men, may be needed:—

"1. To beat, in the field and in passes, any accumulated force in the way. 2. To garrison many important points is the rear, to secure a free communication with Ve

frontier.

I naid: - I had expected that

Department written the day after,
I raid: - I had expected that

Detachments of the new regiments would, as you
had premised me, begin to arrive in this month, and continus to follow perhaps in June." How many "[volunteers] will re-engage, under the sot approved March 3,
(only received two days ago,) I know not; probably but

acts of a secretary are the acts of the President Yet, in my defensive statements, I have effered no wanton discourtesy to the head of the War Department, although that functionary is not in the enumeration of the above mentioned article.

Closing my correspondence with the department until after the approaching trial,

I have the honor to remain, respectfully,

Your most obed't servit, WINFIELD SCOTT.

The Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

atead of going directly to Mexico. You wave permitted at your own request to take a circuitous routs through New York, and there to remain a few days. You stayed to New York nearly an entire week; and not muit the 10th of Dacember (twenty-vit days at the world the 10th of Dacember (twenty-vit days at the religion of the 10th of Dacember (twenty-vit days at the permitted in seven days, if you had been required to take the directroute. This solicited indulgence, by which your arrival at New Orleans was delayed nearly three weeks, is incompatible with your allegation that you were allowed 'only four days at Washington, where twenty might have been mort atvantag-only employed." This complaint has relation to facts within your own knowledge; error, therefore, is hardly renonciable with any solicitated to be accurate. As this is your oponing charge against the War Department, and may be regarded as indicative of those which follow. I hali make the refutation of it still more complete, for they performed the functions of an accuser, and now your allegation is to be disproved. On the day of your departure from Washington, you left with me a paper, in your own hand-writing, dated November 23, 1846, with the following heading:

"Notes suggesting topics to be embraced in the Secretary's instructions to General S, drawn up (in haste) at the request of the former."

From that paper I extraot the following paragraph:

"I (the Secretary of Was) am pleased to learn from your own hand-writing, dated November 23, 1846, with the following heading to the permitted of the former."

From that paper I extraot the following paragraph:

"I (the Secretary of Was) darked to learn from your and the paper in your own think it you have the paper in your own the paper in

ss you had presented it, sumetent cause to your and offer; that, in his opinion, Coi. Harmy had a just cause to complain; and that he hoped the matter had been reconsidered by you, and the solonel restored to his appropriate command. You had really restored to this appropriate command. You had really restored to first proposeding. You had really rebuked and censured your own conduct; for you before you had received the fresident's proceedings. You had, as he hoped you would, reconsidered the matter, become convinced of your error, reversed your own order, and restored Colonal Harney to his command; thus giving the strongest evidence in favor of the propriety and correctness of all the Fresident's process of the propriety and correctness of all the Fresident had done in the case. I give yeu too much credit for steadiness of purpose, to suspect that you retraced your seeps from mere caprice, or for any other cause than a conviction that you had fallen into error. After the matter had thus terminated, it appears unnecountable to me that you, who, above all others, should wish it to pass in the convention of the pass in the case, by referring to your own sets in the campaign of the case, by referring to your own sets in the campaign of 1814. You then ent away, as you allegs, against their wishes, 'three senior field officers, of as many regiments, who were infirm, uninatructed and inefficient;' you did not assign, and in Jeference to the known opinion of the rays and of the present eves. Colonel Harney was not "infirm uninatructed and inefficient;' you did not assign, and in Jeference to the known opinion of the rays and country, you did not assign, and in Jeference to the known opinion of the rays and country, you did not assign, and in Jeference to the known opinion of the rays and opinion of the procedure, you have you the shape to the present even of the president in machine of your logical deduction, that because you, an format manual, for good and as and at any time, do the same thing without any reason whate

rests the sharge, over and over again presented, that you were rebuked by the War Department for discharging the prisoners captured at Gerco Gordo. If, in a case where it was so easy to be right and so difficult to get wrong, you could fall into sunds an obvious mistake, what may not be expected from you in other matters, where your pervented feelings have a freez and a wider range. Before considering your complaints for not having been supplied with sufficient means of transportation for the expedition against Vera Crus, I will notice your "four memorials" to the War Department, in which you demonstrated, as you state, that "Vera Crus was the true basis of operations, and that the senemy's continue basis of operations, and that the senemy's continue basis of operations, and that the senemy's continue to the ment of originating the expedition against two these four memorials, except the to out forth a claim to these four memorials, except the to out forth a claim to the ment of originating the expedition of the ment of originating the expedition against were reactionable route to the city of Mexice was from that point on the Gulf; but your known shorrenes for a "pruriency of fame not sarned" ought to shield you from the suppicion of euch an infirmity.

I am sure you are not ignorant of the feet—but if you sare, it is nevertheless true—that the expedition against Vera Cruz had been for some time under consideration; that great pains had been taken to get information with the great pains had been taken to get information with the great pains had been taken to get information with the great pains had been procured and carefully examined; that persons who had resided there, and officers of the army and many, had been consulted on the subject, and the enterprise actually received on before the date of your first memorial, and before you were thought of to conduct it.

As early as the 9th of July, 1846, within two months after the declaration of var, and before the main body of troops raised for fame with the difficu

istion, they might be constructed by the lat of January. To show what reliance was to be placed on your calculation, I refer to the fact that, though due regard to economy was had in procuring these boosts, each cost on an average \$950—nearly fivefold your estimate. Conceding that you erred much less as to the time within which they could be constructed—nay more, admitting they could be most been ready by the lat of January—and sooner you did not expect they could be made—by no read of the could be made—by no read of the could be made—by no read of the could not go forth without them. In your letter to me dated the 18th of February, off Lobes, you state that but a small part of the transports engaged at New Orleans, under your orders of the 18th December, So, had arrived, and "not one of the ten ordered by your (my) memorandum of the 18th of that month, and the whole were due at the Brasse on the 18th of January." Having thus shown, by your own opinion, that under my order "the ten vessels" ought to have been at the Brasse at least fifteen days before the expedition could have been ready to sail, I have vindicated myself from your charge of having neglected my by by not issuing that order volved a largely increased expenditure for demurrage, and resulted in no public benefit.

But the graver part of this charge is, that none of these "ten vessels" over arrived. "Relying (you say in the letter now under consideration) upon them (the ten vessels) confidently, the embracation was delayed in whole or in part at the Brasse and Tampico, from the 18th of January to the 9th of March, leaving, it was feared, not half the time needed for the reduction of Vera Crus and the cashe before the return of the yellow feet." To whomeever the calculation against Vera Crus had been resolved on some time before you were signed to take commanded in the field, the government, but of it from "etch head of the War Department, allotted to the Quartermasters' department, but when the providing to transportation—in, by the distribution of

cated in most manances in the interior of the country, at a season of the year when water communications were obstructed by ice, could not be ready to be sent from the you in many months after your departure from Washington. Had your requisitions been moderate—and undoubtedly more moderate ones would have been furnished at a much more moderate ones would have been furnished at a much more required to the provide of the pro